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TIME TO RETHINK CYBERSECURITY 
REFORM: THE OPM DATA BREACH AND 




Cybersecurity breaches remain a clear and pervasive risk to the privacy of 
one’s personal data and information. As of July 2015, 888 cybersecurity 
breaches were reported involving some-245.9 million records compromised 
worldwide for just that single year.1 Given the increasing severity and com-
plexity of cyber threats and incidents, this reality logically raises the poignant 
issue of whether the breach of U.S. Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) 
is a different type of breach or—for that matter—a big deal?2 The answer is a 
resounding “yes.” The magnitude and depth of this breach of the Federal Gov-
ernment, must immediately call into question the United States’ cybersecurity 
policies and the troubling track record of various federal agencies ability to 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America - Columbus School of Law, 2016; 
M.S. Business Analytics, The Catholic University of America, 2015; B.A. Political Science, 
Biola University, 2013; B.S. Business Administration - Marketing, Biola University, 2012. I 
gratefully thank Ned Steiner and Michelle Curth for their thoughtful comments and editorial 
savvy throughout my entire writing process, Richard Kisielowski and the entire staff of THE 
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commitment in the development of this Comment, and furthermore my family and friends 
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 1 GEMALTO, INDEX 2015 FIRST HALF REVIEW: FINDINGS FROM THE BREACH LEVEL IN-
DEX 3 (2015), http://bit.ly/244WHpj (“[D]ata records stolen from state-sponsored attacks 
rose dramatically compared to previous years and healthcare and government over took 
retail as the major sectors under siege with the number of compromised data records.”). 
 2 Id. at 3 (“The biggest breach in the first half of this year, which scored a 10 on the 
Breach Level Index magnitude scale, was an identity theft attack on Anthem Insurance that 
exposed 78.8 million records…the analysis period included a breach of 21 million records at 
[OPM] with a Breach Level Index of 9.7….”); see also IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 
DATA BREACH REPORTS 20, 120 (2015), http://bit.ly/1XOPp6W. 
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properly secure sensitive state information and citizens’ private data.3 While 
most private sector breaches are dealt with relatively quickly to ensure con-
sumer confidence,4 the Federal Government lacks this agility to spring to ac-
tion. 
Unable to blame on any one person for this security failure, politicians con-
tinue to decry the OPM Breach as a categorical failure of the Federal Govern-
ment.5 Some suggest this incident is the most detrimental breach of national 
security since the terrorist attacks of September 11th,6 and have dubbed it a 
“Cyber Pearl Harbor.”7 While not all critics have gone so far as to make such a 
dramatic correlation, many agree the failure to protect OPM’s systems is a “da-
ta rupture,”8 or “mega breach”9—one of the largest in United States history to 
date.10 Regardless of the moniker, the effects of the OPM Breach and theft of 
personal data on millions of Americans are serious and will result long-lasting 
                                                     
 3 See, e.g., SEN. TOM COBURN, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S TRACK RECORD ON CY-
BERSECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 2-3 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1Mn4090 (high-
lighting “real lapses by the federal government” with regard to significant breaches in cy-
bersecurity); see also S. REP. NO. 113-240 2 (2014) (“The United States has also seen wide-
spread targeting of, theft, and disruption of information stored on the federal government’s 
own networks, where sensitive information, including information related to the operations 
of critical infrastructure, is at risk of disclosure.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Eric Dezenhall, A Look Back at the Target Breach, HUFF. POST (April 6, 
2015, 10:30 AM), http://huff.to/1T72zND (explaining that more than 100 million people 
were reportedly affected by the Target breach and in the wake of stockholder backlash the 
company spent nearly $252 million to combat the breach, including an additional $10 mil-
lion for customers who could reasonably prove their account was severely compromised 
because of the breach). 
 5 Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, Chaffetz Statement on 
Latest OPM Data Breach Revelation (July 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/244WHG2 (“[S]uch 
incompetence is inexcusable.…”); see also Ellen Nakashima, Chinese breach data of 4 mil-
lion federal workers, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), http://wapo.st/22x7bT8 [hereinafter 
Nakashima I] (statement of California Rep. Adam Schiff). 
This latest intrusion…is among the most shocking because Americans may expect 
that federal computer networks are maintained with state-of-the-art defenses, the 
cyberthreat from hackers, criminals, terrorists and state actors is one of the greatest 
challenges we face on a daily basis, and it’s clear that a substantial improvement in 
our cyber databases and defenses is perilously overdue. 
Id. 
 6 Steve Weisman, The hacking of OPM: Is it our cyber 9/11?, USA TODAY (June 13, 
2015, 9:04 AM), http://usat.ly/1UNLrMF. 
 7 Noah Rothman, The Cyber Pearl Harbor and the Inescapable Gravity of Geopolitics, 
COMMENTARY MAG. (June 5, 2015), http://bit.ly/1VHmmUi. 
 8 Dan Goodin, Call it a “data rupture”: Hack hitting OPM affects 21.5 million, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 9, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://bit.ly/22x7nBV. 
 9 John Eggerton, OPM Director Resigns in Wake of Mega-Breach, MULTICHANNEL 
(July 10, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://bit.ly/1Mn4oEo. 
 10 Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM databases compromised 22.1 million people, feder-
al authorities say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), http://wapo.st/21I9gWp. 
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implications for how the nation must manage and protect sensitive data going 
forward. 
The Obama Administration touted progress when it promotes cybersecurity 
legislation that imposes liability against the private sector as an effort to miti-
gate data breaches.11 However, the OPM Breach highlights the Federal Gov-
ernment’s flawed and misguided understanding of cybersecurity. The current 
framework aggressively penalizes the private sector when it fails to secure in-
dividual’s data, yet falters when policing its own internal policies and agency 
actions.12 Congressman Will Hurd [R-TX] recently noted, “[t]he hypocrisy is 
that while the government leaves its networks and the data of millions of 
Americans at risk, it fines private companies for security breaches.”13 In the 
aftermath of the OPM Breach, the time to reevaluate the nation’s cybersecurity 
strategy and the ability of the Federal Government to secure itself, its employ-
ees, its agencies, and ultimately the American people is now. 
The Federal Government must develop a system that more effectively allo-
cates resources and cybersecurity expertise at home. The backbone of any fed-
eral cybersecurity policy that promotes national security and economic pros-
perity must include a bilateral, international dialogue against state-sponsored 
cyber espionage, whether directed toward the government or the private sec-
tor.14 The OPM Breach highlights the ineffective, fragmented approach the 
                                                     
 11 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Ad-
ministration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015 (July 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1pJlHWy [hereinaf-
ter White House - Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015]. 
From the beginning of his Administration, the President has made it clear that cyber-
security is one of the most important challenges we face as a Nation. In response, the 
U.S. Government has implemented a wide range of policies, both domestic and inter-
national, to improve our cyber defenses, enhance our response capabilities, and up-
grade our incident management tools. 
Id. 
 12 FED. TRADE COMMISSION., 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE 5 (2014), 
http://1.usa.gov/1pJm2IV (“Since 2002, the FTC has brought over 50 cases against compa-
nies that have engaged in unfair or deceptive practices that put consumers’ personal data at 
unreasonable risk.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Data breach re-
sults in $4.8 million HIPAA settlements (May 7, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1RyWq7e (stating 
HHS had reached a resolution agreement with New York and Presbyterian Hospital to pay 
the Office of Civil Rights $3,300,000 to settle potential violations of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Privacy and Security Rules as well as Columbia 
University to pay $1,500,000). 
 13 Will Hurd, Cleaning Up the Federal Cyber Debacle, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2015, 
7:09 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1SiCJDV. 
 14 KRISTEN FINKLEA, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44111, CYBER INTRUSION INTO 
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: IN BRIEF 2-3 (2015), http://bit.ly/1Psy8KJ (“De-
termining an actor (and actor’s motivation) involved in a cyber incident can help guide how 
the United States responds…If the perpetrator is deemed to be a state-sponsored actor with a 
different motivation, the United States may utilize diplomatic or military tools in its re-
sponse.”). 
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Federal Government has previously utilized in modernizing federal cybersecu-
rity. There is a pressing need for the United States Congress to enact legisla-
tion that would centralize the federal cybersecurity systems and focus re-
sources to prevent future breaches rather than merely imposing new criminal 
statutes, reporting requirements, and other bureaucratic measures. 
Now is time for the Federal Government to acknowledge the failure of the 
existing cybersecurity infrastructure. This Comment advocates enacting legis-
lation that would consolidate the management of all federal cybersecurity in-
frastructure under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Part I 
examines the shortcomings in the existing national cybersecurity policy 
framework leading to the failure of OPM and will discuss current legislative 
proposals and pending legislation regarding cybersecurity reform. Part II dis-
cusses the ever-increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber threats and 
the inability of federal infrastructure to face security challenges of a globalized 
cyberspace. The focus is particularly on breaches of government data and the 
failure of OPM to implement necessary infrastructure needed to prevent recur-
ring data breaches. In Part III, this Comment looks to pending complaints filed 
by the affected individuals following the OPM Breach, as well as past instanc-
es where data breaches resulted in adjudication. Finally, Part IV concludes the 
United States cybersecurity policy must better manage federal data by: (1) sus-
pending the current framework, and (2) by implementing a centralized cyber-
security framework that authorizes DHS to exercise regulatory and enforce-
ment powers in order to combat domestic and foreign threats to the federal 
cyber-infrastructure. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On June 4, 2015, The New York Times broke a story revealing OPM experi-
enced an almost year-long intrusion of the agency’s information technology 
systems by unknown intruders.15 OPM is the primary federal agency tasked 
with conducting and storing data related to the majority of federal background 
investigation used to gain security clearances.16 This breach resulted in the ex-
posure of at least four million former and current federal employees’ personal-
ly identifiable information (“PII”).17 Despite this initial report, on June 12, 
2015, the White House confirmed a second, more severe breach that occurred 
earlier in April 2015, which targeted the agency’s database of employee back-
                                                     
 15 David E. Sanger & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking Linked to China Exposes Mil-
lions of U.S. Workers, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1XsoDU6. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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ground investigation records.18 
While OPM initially projected only a small amount of records where com-
promised, an ongoing interagency investigation with DHS has “concluded with 
high confidence that sensitive information, including the Social Security Num-
bers (SSNs) of 21.5 million individuals, was stolen from the background inves-
tigation databases.”19 OPM’s press release stated, “[t]his includes 19.7 million 
individuals that applied for a background investigation, and 1.8 million non-
applicants, predominantly spouses or co-habitants of applicants…and approx-
imately 1.1 million [files] include fingerprints.”20 
In the 21st century, the flow of globally-interconnected information, com-
munications, and data stored across cyberspace21 has become an integral part of 
the Federal Government’s cyber-infrastructure.22 To ignore the severe implica-
tions a breach poses to national security and economic prosperity would be 
grossly negligent.23 Upon taking office, President Barack Obama claimed, 
“[o]ur digital infrastructure—the networks and computers we depend on every 
day—will be treated as they should be: as a strategic national asset.”24 Howev-
er, since the President made this statement, subsequent breaches, hacks, and 
failures of the cyber-systems continue to underscore the failure to establish a 
cohesive strategy.25 In order to realize the vast benefits of technological ad-
                                                     
 18 Kate Vinton, White House Confirms Second Government Data Breach Targeting 
Sensitive Military, Intelligence Personnel Data, FORBES (June 12, 2015, 5:52 PM), 
http://onforb.es/1sNk63q; Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, White House Weighs Sanctions 
After Second Breach of a Computer System, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1pAHqiM; David Bisson, The OPM Breach: Timeline of a Hack, TRIPWIRE 
(July 10, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://bit.ly/1qFw6lD. 
 19 Press Release, U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., OPM Announces Steps to Protect 
Federal Workers and Others from Cyber Threats (July 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1q3e7WL 
[hereinafter OPM - Steps to Protect Fed. Workers]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-24, 3 (January 8, 
2008), http://bit.ly/1RvBAXw (“‘[C]yberspace’ means the interdependent network of in-
formation technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications net-
works, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.”). 
 22 Id. at 2. 
 23 Tony Scott, FACT SHEET: Enhancing and Strengthening the Federal Government’s 
Cybersecurity, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 17, 2015, 5:44 PM), 
http://1.usa.gov/1WMwt8N (“[C]ybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic 
and national security challenges of the 21st Century. Technologies and systems of the past 
cannot keep pace with rapidly evolving and persistent cyber threats.”). 
 24 Remarks on Securing the Nation’s Information and Communications Infrastructure, 
2009 Daily COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOC., DCPD200900410, 3 (May 29, 2009). 
 25 Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden, Chairman on Committee of Finance, to William 
Evanina, Director, Nat’l Counterintelligence and Sec. Ctr. 1 (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://1.usa.gov/1Rn4WKX (“The fact that such sensitive information was not adequately 
protected raises real questions about how well the government can protect personnel infor-
mation in the future, especially as the security clearance process moves toward conducting 
ongoing evaluations and incorporating publicly available electronic information….”). 
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vancements, citizens must be informed and confident in the infrastructure in 
place keeping their information secure and preventing malicious infiltrations.26 
Furthermore, nation require public confidence of their digital infrastructure to 
secure sensitive data and protect national security.27 This is not to say that any 
one policy-shift will prevent all malicious activity, but the nation’s current cy-
bersecurity strategy remains fragmented and its bureaucratic scheme disor-
ganized, which only hinders the America’s ability to engage other nation-states 
in meaningful dialogue to discourage cybercrime in all its forms.28 
Cybersecurity will only continue to pose more challenges to policy makers 
as technology advances; malicious actors will continue to develop new meth-
ods to exploit networks, conduct cyber espionage, or compromise national se-
curity with greater ease.29 Joel Brenner, a former senior counsel to the National 
                                                     
 26 Michael James Barton, The ‘Human’ Factor is Key in Cybersecurity, INSIDESOURCES 
(July 16, 2015), http://bit.ly/1U9Q6XV. 
The human factor has an important element: Policy. The policy governing computer 
access in an organization is critical—who has access to what, and when, and from 
where should be the cornerstone of a security plan. These policies determine who has 
access to what intellectual property, and who may access what information remotely, 
how many characters are required in a password, and a whole host of other elements 
critical to an organization’s security posture. 
Id. 
 27 Kim Zetter & Andy Greenberg, Why The OPM Breach Is Such a Security and Priva-
cy Debacle, WIRED (June 11, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://bit.ly/1Pu5UPN (quoting Chris Eng, 
Vice President of Research Veracode) 
‘It could be very damaging from a counterintelligence and national security stand-
point’…SF-86 forms can include a list of foreign contacts with whom a worker has 
come in contact. Diplomats and other workers with access to classified information 
are required—depending on their job—to provide a list of these contacts. There is 
concern that if the Chinese government got hold of lists containing the names of Chi-
nese nationals who had been in touch with US government workers, this could be 
used to blackmail or punish them if they had been secretive about the contact. 
Id. 
 28 Brendan Sasso, Does NSA Spying Leave the U.S. Without Moral High Ground in 
China Hack?, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2014), http://theatln.tc/1qFwC2Y (“[T]he U.S. is an 
awkward position in deciding how to respond to the humiliating blow. That’s partially be-
cause in the two years since Edward Snowden’s leaks about U.S. surveillance, the Obama 
administration has repeatedly argued that hacking into computer networks to spy on for-
eigners is completely acceptable behavior.”). 
 29 KRISTEN FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42547, 
CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2015), 
http://bit.ly/1OT6flC; Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, Chinese Hackers go after U.S. Work-
ers’ Personal Data, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015), http://wapo.st/21JAkol [hereinafter 
Nakashima II] (quoting Shawn Henry, former executive assistant director of the FBI’s 
Criminal, Cyber, Response and Service Branch) (“If the Chinese government got access to 
that type of data, it would be a significant breach because the data would allow them to have 
very detailed information about people who hold very sensitive clearances….”). 
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Security Agency, explained “[t]he Internet was not built for security, yet we 
have made it the backbone of virtually all private-sector and government oper-
ations, as well as communications.”30 However, this reality cannot simply ab-
solve the government’s obligation to protect sensitive information by imple-
menting a centralized cybersecurity strategy and the development of secure 
cyber-infrastructure. In order to effectuate the goal securing the nation’s criti-
cal infrastructure31, it is necessary to enact cybersecurity legislation with au-
thoritative guidance at the federal level regarding breach notification and miti-
gation for not only the private-sector, but also federal agencies following any 
cyber-attack. 
In addition to the effective education and recruitment of users who are au-
thenticated to use such systems, there must be a consolidation of oversight and 
management of the Federal Government’s cyberspace under the supervision 
and authority of one centralized agency that actively monitors and implements 
necessary infrastructure upgrades. DHS and each agency’s Office of the In-
spector General were recently given more expanded advisory roles in assisting 
agencies in meeting their cybersecurity goals.32 Yet, the evidence shows agen-
cies’ responsiveness ranges from slow to blatantly unresponsive in heeding 
issued warnings, recommendations, and audits—to the detriment of 21.5 mil-
lion Americans with data stolen during the OPM Breach.33 Under a centralized 
                                                     
 30 Joel Brenner, Nations everywhere are exploiting the lack of cybersecurity, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 24, 2014), http://wapo.st/1pKCEA2 (“Pervasive connectivity has brought dra-
matic gains in productivity and pleasure but has created equally dramatic vulnerabilities. 
Huge heists of personal information are common, and cyber-theft of intellectual property 
and infrastructure penetrations continue at a frightening pace.”). 
 31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-626T, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 
CHALLENGES REMAIN IN PROTECTING KEY SECTORS 1-2 n.2 (2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
5195c(e) (“‘[C]ritical infrastructure’ means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, and na-
tional public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”). 
 32 White House - Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015, supra note 11. 
 33 Memorandum from Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General, Office of Personnel 
Mgmt., to Katherine Archuleta, Director, Office of Personnel Mgmt. 1 (June 17, 2015), 
http://1.usa.gov/1UQVT7m [hereinafter Memorandum from Inspector General McFarland 
to Director Archuleta] 
Our primary concern is that the [Office of the Chief Information Officer (“OCIO”)] 
has not followed U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements and 
project management best practices. The OCIO has initiated this project without a 
complete understanding of the scope of OPM’s existing technical infrastructure or the 
scale and costs of the effort required to migrate it to the new environment. 
Id.; Under Attack: Federal Cybersecurity and the OPM Data Breach: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs., 114th Cong. (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter Under 
Attack - S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs.] (statement of Patrick E. McFarland, 
Inspector General, Office of Personnel Mgmt.). (“Although OPM has made progress in 
certain areas, some of the current problems and weaknesses were identified as far back as 
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cybersecurity scheme headed by DHS, agencies ought be required to meet cy-
bersecurity requirements and be held liable for disregarding necessary over-
sight and investment recommendations. 
II. U.S. CYBERSECURITY POLICY: A SCATTERED FRAMEWORK 
There is little doubt the revelation of the OPM Breach thrusted federal cy-
bersecurity back into the spotlight.34 The impetus has long been on expansion, 
modernization, and regulation of private-sector cyberspace rather than on se-
curing the current, aging federal systems.35 However, a review of the nation’s 
cybersecurity policy as a whole reveals a fragmented framework of vague re-
sponsibilities that are delegated to various agencies as a means of combatting 
the expanding threat of cyber-attacks.36 A centralized cybersecurity framework 
would involve both securing the federal cyber-infrastructure as well as assist-
ing in the regulation of nonfederal systems.37 
                                                                                                                          
Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. We believe this long history of systemic failures to properly manage 
its IT infrastructure may have ultimately led to the breaches we are discussing today.”) 
 34 J.D. Harrison, Will OPM Breach Spur Senate Action on Cybersecurity Information-
Sharing Legislation?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (June 19, 2015, 3:45 PM), 
http://uscham.com/1UokcJS. 
 35 See ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO 
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 1-2 (2013), 
http://bit.ly/1U7fE5c (listing recent congressional statutes that address cybersecurity and 
short summaries regarding how the statute affects cybersecurity). 
 36 Id. at 4 
Under current law, all federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to 
their own systems, and many have sector-specific responsibilities for critical infra-
structure, such as the Department of Transportation for the transportation sector. 
Cross-agency responsibilities are complex, and any brief description is necessarily 
oversimplified. In general, in addition to the roles of White House entities, DHS is the 
primary civil-sector cybersecurity agency. NIST, in the Department of Commerce, 
develops cybersecurity standards and guidelines that are promulgated by OMB, and 
the Department of Justice is largely responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to 
cybersecurity. The National Science Foundation (NSF), NIST, and DHS all perform 
research and development (R&D) related to cybersecurity. The National Security 
Agency (NSA) is the primary cybersecurity agency in the national security sector, alt-
hough other agencies also play significant roles. The recently established U.S. Cyber 
Command, part of the U.S. Strategic Command in the Department of Defense (DOD), 
has primary responsibility for military cyberspace operations. 
Id. 
 37 Aliya Sternstein, Senators Want Homeland Security to be a Leading Cyberdefense 
Agency, NAT’L J. (July 23, 2015). 
Just as CYBERCOM monitors and blocks threats to the military network, DHS, under 
proposed legislation, would scan for and repel attacks against the dot-gov domain. In 
the event of a suspected threat, the new 2015 Federal Information Security Manage-
ment Reform Act lets DHS direct agencies ²to take any lawful action with respect to 
2016] Time to Rethink Cybersecurity Reform 441 
However, the complexity of the current cybersecurity framework highlights 
the fragmented oversight and enforcement approaches across the public and 
private sectors,38 which has led to various states’ responses.39 Contributing to 
the complexity, more than fifty federal statutes40 currently bear the burden of 
codifying America’s cybersecurity framework.41 With such a fragmented ap-
proach to cybersecurity, the difficulties faced in implementing a centralized 
national policy and promoting meaningful cybersecurity standards with other 
nation-states should come as no surprise. Technology has progressed signifi-
cantly in the last several decades, to the point where a system can be pro-
grammed and allowed to run with very little need for human interaction or su-
pervision;42 nevertheless, the reality is that the human component in securing 
data remains the largest contributor to breach, loss, and theft.43 Furthermore, 
these advancements have given rise to the threat of hacking organizations, cor-
porate espionage,44 and state-sponsored government espionage.45 
                                                                                                                          
the operation of the information system² at risk. IT systems subject to partial override, 
during emergencies, would include private-sector networks that handle government 
information. The bill also would task DHS with ²conducting targeted risk assessments 
and operational evaluations² of agency and contractor systems, including vulnerability 
scans. 
Id. 
 38 See generally FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 5. 
 39 FRANCESCA SPIDALIERI, PELL CTR. FOR INT’L. RELATIONS AND PUB. POLICY, STATE OF 
THE STATES ON CYBERSECURITY 7-8 (2015), http://bit.ly/1UPdBa9. 
 40 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012) 
(prohibiting unauthorized electronic eavesdropping); E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2012) (serving as the primary legislative vehicle to guide federal IT management and 
initiatives to make information and services available online, and includes various cyberse-
curity requirements); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 
3541, et seq. (2012) (clarifying and strengthening NIST and agency cybersecurity responsi-
bilities, establishing a central federal incident center, and making OMB, rather than the Sec-
retary of Commerce, responsible for promulgating federal cybersecurity standards); see 
generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 52-61 tbl.2 (listing the entire list of federal statutes con-
cerning cybersecurity). 
 41 See FISHER, supra note 35, at 52-61 tbl.2. 
 42 Barton, supra note 26. 
 43 Id. (“Companies can no longer rely on software, hardware and security firewalls. 
Their employees are the target of the professional hackers, and are the network’s weak link. 
Routine cybersecurity training paired with a robust review of policy provides the best de-
fense of an organization’s network.”). 
 44 Charles Riley, Xi Goes to Washington: 4 Problems for the U.S. and China, CNN 
MONEY (Sept. 18, 2015, 2:52 AM), http://cnnmon.ie/22yU3gj (“Washington also says it has 
caught Chinese spies stealing blueprints and business plans. Last year, federal prosecutors 
took the unprecedented step of filing formal criminal charges against five Chinese govern-
ment spies for breaking into Alcoa, U.S. Steel Corp., Westinghouse and others.”). 
 45 Alan Spiress, Computer System Under Attack, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2006), 
http://wapo.st/1WMGhjb (noting in 2006 Chinese hackers breached the system of a sensi-
tive Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security, “forcing it to replace hundreds 
of workstations and block employees from regular use of the Internet for more than a 
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Despite the ever evolving external threats associated with cybersecurity, the 
internal threats are most neglected and can easily cripple any policy framework 
that is not properly implemented or adhered to. A recent Government Ac-
countably Office (“GAO”) review of federal information security found there 
was a significant decrease in agencies reporting their users had received securi-
ty awareness training in 2014.46 The effective cornerstone of any policy rec-
ommendation on cybersecurity must focus on securing user access, system 
modification capabilities, and exfiltration sensitive federal data clearance, 
since these users remain the greatest risk to the proper function of any cyberse-
curity policy.47 
Currently, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
(“FISMA”), and its amended iterations are the primary means of codifying the 
government’s approach to cybersecurity.48 However, in the wake of the OPM 
Breach, the Obama Administration’s own cybersecurity agenda together with 
pending legislative proposals before Congress fall short in synthesizing the 
United States’ response to increasingly malicious cybersecurity threats. 
A. The Federal Information Security Management Acts of 2002 and 2014 
Under FISMA,49 federal agencies are tasked with cybersecurity responsibili-
ties relating to their own systems, while other responsibilities for cybersecurity 
functions are distributed among several other agencies.50 The FISMA scheme 
tasks each agency head to provide “information security protections commen-
surate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of” the agen-
                                                                                                                          
month.”); Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://wapo.st/1WMGhQe (“Hackers thought to be working for the Russian 
government breached the unclassified White House computer networks in recent weeks…”). 
 46 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-714, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURI-
TY: AGENCIES NEED TO CORRECT WEAKNESSES AND FULLY IMPLEMENT SECURITY PROGRAMS 
37 (2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-714]. 
 47 Barton, supra note 26; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HANDING OVER 
THE KEYS TO THE CASTLE: OPM DEMONSTRATED THAT ANTIQUATED SECURITY PRACTICES 
HARM NATIONAL SECURITY 21 (2015), http://bit.ly/1XRiC1e [hereinafter HANDING OVER 
THE KEYS TO THE CASTLE] (“Reform of the critical cybersecurity infrastructure as refor-
mation of expertise of personnel, reformation of vulnerable, outdated technology, and 
reformation to end 25 years of poor cybersecurity practices can last far longer than 30 years 
and help to mitigate extenuating long-term consequences of the OPM’s breach.”). 
 48 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541, et seq. 
(2012). 
 49 Id. 
 50 HOUSE REPUBLICAN CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 
13 (2011), http://1.usa.gov/1VLiL7I (“FISMA is the main law governing the federal gov-
ernment’s information security program.”). 
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cy’s information or information systems.51 In addition, the legislation requires 
federal agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide infor-
mation security program.52 Often such tasks are designated to the Chief Infor-
mation Officer (“CIO”) within each agency.53 Under current law, in addition to 
its budgetary role in federal cybersecurity efforts, the Office of Management 
and Budget (“OMB”) possesses the primary responsibility for promulgating 
and enforcing information security requirements under FISMA for federal in-
formation systems for many federal agencies and most notably OPM.54 
FISMA requires agencies provide security awareness training to personnel, 
including contractors and other users of information systems that support the 
operations and assets of the agency.55 This scheme provides guidelines to 
agencies regarding information security risks associated with their operational 
activities and details the responsibilities each agency possesses—yet falls short 
of centralizing oversight authority to one particular agency in order to protect 
national security.56 FISMA also requires agencies to train and oversee person-
nel who have significant information security responsibilities.57 While the 
number of individuals with significant security responsibilities has decreased 
in 2014, there has been an increase in user and contractor related breach inci-
dents that call into question whether agencies are doing enough to properly 
train individuals.58 
In April 2015, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Office of Inspector Gen-
eral reported two contractors had improperly accessed the agency’s network 
from foreign countries using personally owned equipment.59 In February 2015, 
                                                     
 51 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3543 (2012). 
 52 Id. § 3544(a). 
 53 Id. § 3544. 
 54 ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43831, CYBERSECURITY ISSUES AND CHAL-
LENGES: IN BRIEF 3 (2014), http://bit.ly/1YT5dX6; The Expanding Cyber Threat: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Res. & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th Cong. 
66 (2015) (statement of Eric A. Fisher, Senior Specialist in Science & Technology, Con-
gressional Research Service). 
 55 GAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 7. 
 56 FINKLEA ET AL., supra note 14, at 6 (“FISMA largely does not apply to national secu-
rity systems, which fall under the Committee on National Security 
Systems.”); Richard W. Walker, FISMA Security Approach Falls Short, Fed IT Pros Say, 
INFORMATIONWEEK DARKREADING (Sept. 25, 2013), http://ubm.io/25izs1d (according to a 
2013 OMB survey, only 27% of federal agencies reported that their agencies are “currently 
perfectly compliant” with FISMA). 
 57 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-776, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURI-
TY: MIXED PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING PROGRAM COMPONENTS; IMPROVED METRICS NEED-
ED TO MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS 16 (2013), http://1.usa.gov/244Y0EO. 
 58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-612, INFORMATION SECURITY: AGEN-
CIES NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTOR CONTROLS 17 (2014), 
http://1.usa.gov/1THdTjr. 
 59 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT NO. 13-01730-159, 
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the Director of National Intelligence stated that unauthorized computer intru-
sions were detected on the networks of OPM and two of its contractors.60 The 
contractors were processing sensitive PII, related to national security clearanc-
es for federal employees. While these instances stand apart from otherwise 
unknown actors that caused the OPM Breach, one contractors has been impli-
cated in the breach.61 The GAO’s focus on cybersecurity training for users 
clearly highlights one of the more fundamental recommendations that agencies 
must implement in order to become better prepared to combat cybersecurity 
threats.62 Providing training for agency personnel is critical to securing systems 
and information because people are one of the weakest links when securing 
systems and networks. 
In the wake of these security incidents, Congress passed an updated Federal 
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014,63 (“FISMA 2014”) which 
was signed into law by President Obama in December 2014.64 This legislation 
was the first attempt in more than a decade by the Federal Government toward 
delegating agency tasks with regard to cybersecurity and data protection.65 As 
amended, FISMA 2014 still requires federal agencies to implement agency-
wide cybersecurity programs to protect sensitive data and information, extend-
ing such requirements to service and systems provided or managed by another 
agency, contractor, or outside source.66 However, FISMA 2014 expands au-
thorization to include DHS, by tasking them to assist OMB with oversight and 
regulation of agencies’ implementation of cybersecurity programs, operate the 
federal information security incident center (“US-CERT”), and provide agen-
cies with operational and technical assistance for continuously monitoring and 
mitigating cyber vulnerabilities (“EINSTEIN”).67 
Codifying a set of directives outlined in 2010 from the Obama Administra-
                                                                                                                          
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION: IMPROPER ACCESS TO THE VA NETWORK BY VA CONTRAC-
TORS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES 2 (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1XRkiYs. 
 60 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/25iz6rd (state-
ment of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). 
 61 Aaron Boyd, Contractor breach gave hackers keys to OPM data, FED. TIMES (June 
25, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://bit.ly/1RllYnW. 
 62 GAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 27. 
 63 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 
Stat. 3073 (2014). 
 64 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press Secre-
tary Bills Signed into Law (Dec. 18, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1XXgSDJ. 
 65 Sean B. Hoar, Congress Passes the Federal Information Security Modernization Act 
of 2014: Bringing Federal Agency Information Security into the New Millennium, PRIV. & 
SEC. L. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014), http://bit.ly/1MoBMLf. 
 66 GAO-15-714, supra note 46, at 11. 
 67 Id. at 11. 
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tion’s cybersecurity policy objective, the FISMA 2014 gives DHS operational 
authority to oversee implementation of federal cybersecurity systems, includ-
ing the authority to issue binding operational directives68 and set requirements 
for breach notification within federal agencies.69 In addition, agency CIOs were 
provided with additional budgeting and program authorities.70 In addition to the 
advisory roles played predominately by OMB and DHS, other agencies such as 
the National Institute of Science and Technology (“NIST”), played a critical 
role in issuing and updating security standards and guidelines for information 
systems utilized by Federal agencies.71 Despite these updates, the OPM Breach 
reveals how little impact such changes have had in impacting the government’s 
approach to these real, ever present threats. 
B. Current Legislative Proposals 
Several bills concerning cyber threats have been proposed by the current 
Congress, although all stagnated in Spring 2015.72 Nevertheless, in the wake of 
the OPM Breach, legislators have called for a renewed push toward meaning-
ful reform on cybersecurity.73 While much progress was made during Summer 
2015 on amending these cyber-related bills, many have cautioned that the cur-
                                                     
 68 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 
Stat. 3073 (2014) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3552(b)(1)). 
The term “binding operational directive” means a compulsory direction to an agency 
that is for the purposes of safeguarding Federal information and information systems 
from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability or 
risk. 
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 69 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag & Howard A. Schmidt to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies 2 (July 6, 2010), http://1.usa.gov/1UokNvg (delegating respon-
sibilities to DHS in 2010). 
 70 40 U.S.C. § 11319 (2014). 
 71 See ELAINE BARKER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800-
56B, RECOMMENDATION FOR PAIR-WISE KEY-ESTABLISHMENT SCHEMES USING INTEGER 
FACTORIZATION CRYPTOGRAPHY, at ii (2014), http://1.usa.gov/1XRkRSg (“NIST is respon-
sible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum 
requirements for Federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not 
apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate Federal offi-
cials exercising policy authority over such systems.”). 
 72 RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43317, CYBERSECURITY: LEGISLATION, HEAR-
INGS, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS 2 (2015), http://bit.ly/1Ts7fPH (“More than 20 
bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would address several issues, includ-
ing data-breach notification, incidents involving other nation-states, information sharing, 
law enforcement and cybercrime, protection of critical infrastructure (CI), workforce devel-
opment, and education.”). 
 73 INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., MOVING FORWARD: HOW VICTIMS CAN 
REGAIN CONTROL AND MITIGATE THREATS IN THE WAKE OF THE OPM BREACH 3-4 (2015), 
http://bit.ly/1XRiC1e [hereinafter MOVING FORWARD]. 
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rent proposals remain disproportionally focused on: breach notifications, in-
formation sharing and private sector enforcement rather than on agency juris-
diction, oversight authority, and infrastructure protection.74 
The House of Representatives bills—originally labeled H.R. 1560: Protect-
ing Cyber Networks Act (“PCNA”); and H.R. 1731: the National Cybersecuri-
ty Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (“NCPAA”)—passed the House dur-
ing the week of April 20, 2015 and were consolidated, with the PCNA becom-
ing Title I and the NCPAA Title II of H.R. 1560.75 Both these bills focus on the 
sharing of cyber threat information within the private sector, and between the 
private sector and government, creating a structure for the information-sharing 
process; and further address issues like consumer privacy, individual civil lib-
erties with regard to PII, and the liability risks of private-sector sharing.76 
In the Senate, S. 754, the Cyber Information Sharing Act of 2015 (“CISA”), 
and S. 456, The Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 (“CTSA”), have been com-
bined under S. 754.77 The bill was long stalled in the Senate, but passed in Oc-
tober 2015.78 Following the OPM Breach revelation, the White House was 
quick to endorse this effort by suggesting the Senate bill improved on earlier 
efforts—both in the protection of PII and better intimations on the allowed us-
es of personal information.79 However, there was intense opposition to S. 754 
from civil liberties, privacy advocates, some legislators, and even from the 
DHS itself.80 Senator Al Franken [D-MN] warned the sharing provisions of the 
bill, “could sweep away important privacy protections.”81 The opposition re-
                                                     
 74 See Bryan Thompson & Sean B. Hoar, 2015 Data Breach Legislation Six Month Re-
view: Many Proposals, Few Changes, PRIV. & SEC. L. BLOG (July 8, 2015), 
http://bit.ly/1TSIbvH ; Katie Bo Williams, Six Cybersecurity Lawmakers to Watch in 2016, 
THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2015, 6:05 AM), http://bit.ly/1RppVLM; Katie Bo Williams, House 
Passes Bill Mandating DHS Cybersecurity Strategy, THE HILL (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:52 PM), 
http://bit.ly/1VLmmCV. 
 75 ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44069, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION 
SHARING: COMPARISON OF H.R. 1560 (PCNA AND NCPAA) AND S. 754 (CISA) 3 (2015), 
http://bit.ly/1TSIjLA. 
 76 ERIC A. FISHER & STEPHANIE M. LOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43996, CYBERSE-
CURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: COMPARISON OF H.R. 1560 AND H.R. 1731 AS PASSED 
BY THE HOUSE 2-3 (2015), http://bit.ly/1Tvl7DH. 
 77 Taylor Armerding, Cybersecurity Legislation Still Draws Intense Opposition, CIO 
(Sept. 23, 2015, 7:08 AM), http://bit.ly/1pKNRAs. 
 78 See S.754 – Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, Congress.gov (last visit-
ed Mar. 7, 2016), http://1.usa.gov/1U9Rjyr. 
 79 Cory Bennet, White House Endorses Senate Cyber Bill, THE HILL (Aug. 4, 2015, 5:29 
PM), http://bit.ly/1T9BGZl. 
 80 Eric Geller, Sen. Ron Wyden thinks the next big cybersecurity bill could make things 
worse, THE DAILY DOT (Sept. 14, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://bit.ly/1TSIg2r. 
 81 Sen. Al. Franken, Remarks of Sen. Al Franken on the Cybersecurity and Information 
Sharing Act of 2015, SEN. AL FRANKEN (Oct. 22, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1SfR29O; see also 
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sulted in more than a hundred amendments, only three of which were ultimate-
ly agreed upon, drawing even more opposition of the bill to protect privacy.82 
One such amendment, which could seemingly keep the impetus on cyberse-
curity reform in the congressional forefront is S. 1828, the Federal Information 
Security Management Reform Act of 2015, would directly tackle federal cy-
bersecurity issues raised with the OPM Breach.83 Several senators have even 
gone so far as to publicly endorse a revamping of cybersecurity policy that 
would put DHS in charge.84 Senator Susan Collins [R-ME], who co-sponsored 
S. 1828, stated at its introduction: 
At present, DHS does not have the authority to monitor the networks of 
government agencies unless they have permission from that agency. DHS also 
cannot regularly deploy countermeasures to block malware without permission 
from the agency. This limited authority hinders the security of .gov infor-
mation systems which – as evidenced by the recent OPM attack – contain high-
ly sensitive personal data such as Social Security numbers, home addresses, 
dates of birth, and in some cases, extensive background information of federal 
employees, retirees, and contractors.85 
In total, S. 1828 addresses five key policy areas to combatting future cyber-
attacks by: (1) allowing DHS to operate intrusion detection and prevention 
capabilities on all federal agencies on the “.gov  domain;”86 (2) direct DHS to 
conduct risk assessments of any network within the government domain;87 (3) 
give the Secretary of DHS authority to operate defensive countermeasures on 
these agency networks once a cyber threat has been detected;88 (4) strengthen 
and streamline the authority Congress gave to DHS last year to issue binding 
operational directives to federal agencies, especially to respond to substantial 
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 85 Press Release, Sen. Kelly Ayotte, Following Cyber Attack at OPM, Ayotte and Col-
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Cong. (2015). 
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 88 Id. 
448 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.2 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
cybersecurity threats in emergency circumstances;89 and (5) require the OMB 
to report to Congress annually on the extent to which it has exercised its exist-
ing authority to enforce government-wide cybersecurity standards.90 
While the co-sponsors of the bill suggest the proposal is a proper fix to the 
procedural problems that led to the devastating OPM Breach, others have de-
cried it as a simple codification of the role DHS has already tried to take in 
light the increased threat of cyber-attacks in the last decade.91 This is not to say 
that legislatively authorizing DHS with centralized authority will not be the 
first step in streamlining the process of securing the nation’s cyber-
infrastructure. Unfortunately, this legislation does not authorize the DHS to 
take control of agency networks during cyber-emergencies nor does it define 
what a cyber-emergency might constitute.92 Senator Mark Warner [D-VA] has 
stated, 
The attack on OPM has been a painful illustration of just how behind the 
curve some of our federal agencies have been when it comes to cybersecuri-
ty…If we want to be better prepared to meet this threat in the future, we have 
to make sure that the [DHS] has the tools it needs to adequately secure our fed-
eral civilian networks.93 
C. The Administrative Approach – Executive Orders and Political Banter 
Since taking office, President Barack Obama has touted the work that his 
Administration has done in regard to securing the nation’s cyberspace.94 Im-
mediately after taking office, President Obama announced his plan to tackle 
cybersecurity issues.95 While such plans shifted in the subsequent years, in 
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 91 Senator Susan M. Collins, Statement on S. 1828, (July 22, 2015), 
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In 2009, President Obama named the first Cybersecurity Coordinator and directed a 
comprehensive Cyberspace Policy Review to assess U.S. policies and structures for 
cybersecurity. Since then, the Administration has taken a number of aggressive ac-
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2015, the President released Executive Order regarding cybersecurity threats in 
the wake of increasing private sector breaches96 and most recently issued Ex-
ecutive Order 13694, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in con-
sultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose fi-
nancial sanctions on individuals and entities whose malicious cyber-enabled 
activities have contributed to a significant threat to the national security, for-
eign policy, economic health, or financial stability of the United States.97 A 
move lauded as a strong political maneuver sharply directed at those engaging 
in state-sponsored or government espionage.98 
Even as recently as July 2015, following the OPM Breach, OMB was di-
rected to launch a 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint to assess and improve the 
health of all federal assets and networks, both civilian and military.99 As part of 
this “Sprint,” OMB ordered agencies to further protect federal information, 
improve the resilience of its networks, and report on their successes and chal-
lenges.100 Agencies were instructed to immediately patch critical vulnerabili-
ties, review and tightly limit the number of privileged users with access to au-
thorized systems, and introduce strong authentication, especially for privileged 
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ernment networks and information, implementing tools and policies in order to detect 
and mitigate evolving threats. 
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TUNE (Apr. 2, 2015, 9:47 AM), http://for.tn/1sNlFP9. 
 99 Scott, supra note 23 (“United States Chief Information Officer (CIO) Tony Scott 
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 100 Id. 
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users.101 All of these actions reduce the risk of adversaries penetrating federal 
networks. While the policy goals won political points in the news cycle, at a 
time when some federal employees were just beginning to be notified that their 
private information had been compromised, the excitement has wore thin with 
the high-level administration officials, and the mess has since been left to the 
agency heads and congressional committees to figure out how to grasp and 
reconcile the remain difficult issues.102 
III.  AGING INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE INCREASING THREAT OF 
FEDERAL DATA BREACHES 
Despite the various efforts to implement a cybersecurity policy for the na-
tion, the reality is technology has advanced far faster in the last decade than the 
Federal Government’s ability to regulate and protect these systems.103 Since 
2006, the number cybersecurity incidents related to federal systems has in-
creased exponentially, severely calling into question the effectiveness of the 
government’s current approach to data protection.104 According to the GAO 
and US-CERT, 5,503 incidents were reported in 2006 compared to 67,168 re-
ported in 2014—an increase of more than 1,100 percent.105 This increase in 
reported incidents is staggering considering the amount of money and re-
sources spent by the Federal Government on information technology and cy-
bersecurity infrastructure. Some have begun to question as to whether the in-
vestment has been worth the return.106 
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The Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 2016 allocates $14 billion on cybersecu-
rity.107 President Obama requested $12.5 billion in 2015, which is roughly ten 
percent less; yet, the figure is almost 35 percent more than was spent in Fiscal 
Year 2014.108 The federal cybersecurity budget represents about 16 percent of 
the total federal information technology budget of $86.4 billion for 2016, com-
pared to the four percent that private companies typically allocate for the same 
purpose.109 
DHS has allotted a large portion of its 2016 Budget—$582 million—for the 
EINSTEIN intrusion detection system, continuous diagnostics programs, and 
mitigation programs alone in order to continue the progress that has been made 
in deploying early detection systems across various federal agency networks.110 
The latest EINSTEIN intrusion detection iteration, EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated 
or “E3A” is particularly of interest because it is purportedly capable of detect-
ing the types of intrusions that occurred at OPM.111 While the system has been 
functional for a short while, DHS has been unsuccessful at securing its imple-
mentation across the federal agency network; the agency remains confident it 
will continue to expand the systems reach in order to detect future threats.112 
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 110 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FEDERAL INFORMATION 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT 6 (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1T9FfyF (“The President’s FY 2016 
Budget also invests $582 million to drive continued progress through CDM and EINSTEIN 
to enable agencies to detect and prevent evolving cyber threats.”). 
 111 Under Attack - S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs., supra note 42 (written 
statement of Dr. Andy Ozment, Assistant Secretary, Office of Cybersecurity & Communica-
tions, National Protection and Programs Directorate); see also Jeh Charles Johnson, Secre-
tary of Homeland Security, Securing The .Gov, Remarks Before the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (July 8, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/22L3WUN [hereinafter Johnson - Se-
curing The .Gov](“E3A has the capacity to both identify and block known malicious traf-
fic…one key value of E3A is that it is an intrusion detection and prevention system that uses 
classified information to protect unclassified information.”). 
 112 Johnson - Securing The .Gov, supra note 111 
By December 2014, E3A protected 237,414 federal personnel. Today, E3A protects 
over 931,000 federal personnel, or approximately 45% of the federal civilian govern-
ment. I have directed that DHS make E3A fully available to all federal departments 
and agencies, and have challenged us to make aspects of E3A available to all federal 
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Had EINSTEIN been deployed at OPM, some have suggested the intrusions 
could have been detected sooner, if not thwarted completely.113 
Despite the federal expenditure on cybersecurity, the risks for many federal 
agencies appear to be getting worse.114 DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson recently 
testified: 
To be frank, our federal .gov [domain] cybersecurity, in particular, is not where it 
needs to be…There is a great deal that has been done and is being done now to secure 
our networks. We do, in fact, block a large number of intrusions and exfiltrations, in-
cluding those by state actors. But much more must be done.115 
While budget concerns continually have resulted in blame from all sides of 
the aisle, increased expenditure on cybersecurity infrastructure “does not mean 
that all agencies have benefited equally from the largesse.”116 The Department 
of Defense (“DOD”) and DHS have been the largest recipients of federal cy-
bersecurity budgets. With $14 billion set aside for cybersecurity in the 2016 
Federal Budget, approximately $5.5 billion is allocated to the DOD.117 
Even in 2014, “the DOD and the DHS alone accounted for $10.3 billion of 
the total $12.7 billion in IT [information technology] security spending report-
ed by federal agencies.”118 In the 2016 budget, DHS is getting a small increase 
of $7 million to its $473 million allotment for preventing malicious cyber ac-
tivity against government agencies, and an additional $102.6 million to its 
$722 million budget for detecting, analyzing, and mitigating threats on behalf 
of other agencies.119 Despite these budget increases, OPM dedicated only a 
combined $7 million to these two categories of tasks in 2014, even though the 
agency stores the PII of 32 million federal employees, more than most other 
federal agencies.120 While budgeting concerns must always remain at the fore-
                                                                                                                          
civilian departments and agencies by the end of 2015. 
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HOMELAND SEC. (February 2, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1UW2nkc. 
 120 Mohana Ravindranath, Before Breach, OPM Requested Millions of Dollars to Up-
grade Network Security, NEXTGOV (June 5, 2015), http://bit.ly/1U9ROsm (“OPM’s 2016 
budget request, released in February, proposed an additional $21 million in funding to ‘im-
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front of any enterprise—federal or civilian—the priority is and must remain the 
implementation of a policy framework that ensures centralized cybersecurity 
management. The various incidents in the last several years should ring alarm 
bells and demonstrates as how aging infrastructure and fragmented manage-
ment have crippled the systems tasked with protecting highly sensitive data. 
A. 2015: The Year of the Breach 
In 2014, the GAO reported that 67,168 incidents were reported by federal 
agencies.121 Given the growth in scope and scale of the cyber risks, it is no sur-
prise that 2015 has given rise four significant incidents that highlight the fail-
ure of the current framework.122 Beginning in late-2014, the United States 
Postal Service reported its information technology (“IT”) systems had been 
compromised and the data of nearly 800,000 employees had been exposed.123 
In April 2015, the Department of Veteran Affairs announced that un-
credentialed access had occurred to its network.124 In June 2015, the IRS publi-
cally disclosed a breach of taxpayer information exposed the records of nearly 
330,000 individuals, with potentially more affected.125 Even before the June 
2015 revelation of the largest breach in U.S. history that compromised OPM’s 
network, the Director of National Intelligence revealed in February 2015 that 
they suspected unauthorized computer intrusions by outside contractors on the 
OPM network dating back to early 2014.126 
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B. OPM—The Largest Hack in U.S. History 
In June 2015, OPM publically reported a cyber intrusion—allegedly by Chi-
nese hackers127—that affected personnel records of over four million current 
and former federal employees.128 OPM, under then-Director Katherine Ar-
chuleta, then announced that a separate incident may have compromised OPM 
systems relating to databases on background investigations conducted for secu-
rity clearance.129 Despite the fallout from the incident, diminished public per-
ception of the agency, and congressional calls for leadership change at OPM130, 
the Obama Administration defended the actions of OPM and Director Ar-
chuleta.131 Reports issued in the subsequent weeks suggested the total number 
of affected federal employees could be much higher, and in early July 2015, 
OPM admitted that as many as 21.5 million past, current, and prospective fed-
eral employees had been affected by the breach, as well as other individuals for 
whom a federal background investigations were conducted.132 
Congressman Jason Chaffetz [R-UT], Chairman of the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, has led the congressional charge in chal-
lenging OPM regarding its negligent behavior and failed implementation of 
compliant cybersecurity measures.133 Since the revelation of the Breach, sever-
al congressional inquiries have led to new information surrounding the events 
of the OPM Breach, most recently revealing that 5.6 million fingerprints were 
additionally stolen.134 In response to the increased number of compromised 
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sional Inquisition, For Now, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), http://wapo.st/1U7fxqd. 
 134 Press Release, Office of Personnel Mgmt., Statement by OPM Press Secretary Sam 
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http://1.usa.gov/21NYy0E; see, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. D797 (daily ed. July 8, 2015); 114 
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fingerprints, Chairman Chaffetz stated: 
OPM keeps getting it wrong. This breach continues to worsen for the 21.5 
million Americans affected. I have zero confidence in OPM’s competence and 
ability to manage this crisis. OPM’s [information technology] management 
team is not up to the task. They have bungled this every step of the way.135 
Information released in June 2015 regarding the initial hack of OPM’s net-
work indicates that hackers gained access to employees’ personal information, 
including their “Social Security numbers, job assignments, performance ratings 
and training information.”136 The second reported breach involved the theft of 
data on 19.7 million current, former, and prospective employees, and contrac-
tors who applied for a background investigation in 2000 or after using certain 
OPM forms.137 This second breach also impacted the personal information of 
1.8 million non-applicants; OPM notes that these non-applicants are primarily 
individuals married to or otherwise cohabitating with background investigation 
applicants.138 
OPM confirmed the “[u]sernames and passwords that background investiga-
tion applicants used to fill out their background investigation forms were also 
stolen.”139 Notably, the two breaches revealed in June 2015 were not the first 
incidents targeting OPM databases containing such sensitive information.140 In 
a previous 2014 breach of OPM, hackers purportedly targeted “files on tens of 
thousands of employees who [had] applied for top-secret security clearanc-
es.”141 
Reportedly, the hackers used compromised security credentials—those as-
signed to a KeyPoint Government Solutions employee, a federal background 
check contractor working on OPM systems—to exploit OPM’s systems and 
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gain access. Officials do not believe the intruders are still in the system.142 In 
the aftermath of the intrusions, Katherine Archuleta stepped down as the direc-
tor of OPM amid several criticisms with how she managed the agency’s re-
sponse to the hack, but to many it was merely a passing of blame.143 Beth 
Cobert, Deputy Director for Management and the U.S. Chief Performance Of-
ficer since October 2013, was appointed interim acting director for the agency 
following Archuleta’s resignation144 and President Obama has announced his 
intention to nominate her as the permanent replacement.145 In addition, OPM’s 
Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing application, the “web-
based automated system that was designed to facilitate the processing of stand-
ard investigative forms used when conducting background investigations,” has 
been taken offline for “security enhancements.”146 
1. Why OPM? 
To the typical civilian, OPM is better likened to the Human Resources De-
partment of any business.147 As such, the agency is responsible for the collec-
tion and storage of a substantial amount of confidential and sensitive personnel 
records for roughly 32 million past, current, and potential federal employees.148 
Given the nature of federal employment positions, OPM conducts “over two 
million background investigations yearly with over 650,000 conducted to sup-
                                                     
 142 See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. D715 (daily ed. June 16, 2015). 
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MANCE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016, (2015), http://1.usa.gov/1SfU8dO (“As a proprietor of 
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port initial security clearance determinations…more than 95% of the Govern-
ment total.”149 
As an applicant for security clearances, one must “complete a 127-page 
Standard Form-86 (“SF-86”), which contains all of their personal information, 
work history, family, associates, deviances, and proclivities.”150 “In the latter 
breach, 21.5 million SF-86 were successfully extracted by an unknown ac-
tor.”151 This amount of data collected and stored creates a treasure trove of fed-
eral data, including the most sensitive personal records of persons whom have 
worked in the Federal Government, as far as 1985.152 Some have even likened 
the breach to stealing the “crown jewels” of federal information, because sev-
eral million of the compromised records contain the identities and information 
of many covert federal operators.153 
2. What Went Wrong at OPM? 
Given the sensitive nature of the data that OPM collects and stores on it 
servers, it should come as no surprise that OPM on average receives “10 mil-
lion confirmed intrusion attempts” targeting its network infrastructure each 
month.154 While these intrusions are often unauthorized attempts that are more 
readily detectable under the current cybersecurity framework, the larger threat 
to the nation’s cyberspace has increasingly come from authorized intrusions 
that result from compromised employee credentials and legitimate access to 
the network.155 This threat has become so effective that even the DHS’s newest 
systems designed to monitor and detect malicious threats have difficulty deci-
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phering what is legitimate and what is truly malicious when it is perpetrated by 
compromised credentials.156 Since the OPM Breach, congressional inquiry and 
agency reports have suggested that, despite this threat, OPM possessed the 
necessary resources and were repeatedly put on notice of the potential security 
threat that their legacy systems posed to the data they maintain.157 
In November 2013, actors breached OPM systems and extracted “manuals” 
relating to network assets and information about the internal infrastructure.158 
In August 2014, OPM’s largest contractor tasked with providing background 
investigation services, USIS, disclosed a breach of its systems by Chinese 
hacker that lasted for over a year and compromised the information of approx-
imately 27,000 DHS employees.159 USIS filed for bankruptcy immediately fol-
lowing OPM’s decision to rescind its contracts and delegated all background 
checks to KeyPoint.160 In December 2014, KeyPoint disclosed a breach of its 
network, which had lasted at least 10 months and may have compromised the 
information of 48,439 federal workers.161 
In OPM’s 2014 audit, the Inspector General Michael Esser, provided a total 
of 29 recommendations covering a wide variety of IT security topics.162 Ac-
cording to his own testimony during a July 2015 congressional hearing, “Only 
3 of these 29 recommendations have been closed to date, and 9 of the open 
recommendations are long-standing issues that were rolled forward from prior 
year FISMA audits.”163 However, the three major vulnerabilities in OPM’s 
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Cyber Security Protocol contributed to the security incident, which includes: 
decentralized cybersecurity governance, outdated systems authorization, and 
non-compliant policies, procedures and technical controls.164 
Without a centralized cybersecurity team responsible for overseeing all of 
OPM’s cybersecurity efforts, OPM created many instances of non-compliance 
with FISMA requirements.165 Primarily, OPM’s Office of the Chief Infor-
mation Officer (“OCIO”), is responsible for the agency’s overall cybersecurity 
infrastructure and implementation of security controls.166 However, such re-
sponsibilities have been subsequently found to have resided within individual 
program offices, leaving many important upgrade programs unimplemented, 
untested, and the department in much disagreement about the overarching cy-
bersecurity strategy. Such deficiencies were well documented in all of the 
OIG’s Audit Reports, dating back to 2007; however, the implementation of 
some new reporting structures within have contributed to better communica-
tion within the various program offices and the OCIO.167 
The OIG found that OPM was not in compliance with several standards 
promulgated under 40 U.S.C. § 11331,168 as is required by FISMA 2014, in-
cluding in the areas of risk management, configuration management, incident 
response and reporting, continuous monitoring management, contractor sys-
tems, security capital planning, and contingency planning.169 According to the 
OIG’s Congressional testimony, “Not only was a large volume (11 out of 47 
systems) of OPM’s IT systems operating without a valid Authorization, but 
several of these systems are among the most critical and sensitive applications 
owned by the agency.”170 Even in the wake of the breach, the OIG instructed 
that OPM’s Director strongly consider shutting down software systems that did 
not have a current and valid authorization.171 In the audit report, however, the 
OIG noted OPM refused and instead stated it would work with information 
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system security officers, both to ensure OPM systems maintain current author-
izations and no interruptions to OPM’s operations.172 
While there is much to be said about the events that led to the failure of 
OPM’s cybersecurity infrastructure and the failure of its managers to imple-
ment a centralized cybersecurity system, the events of the Breach have since 
led to the resignation of Katherine Archuleta and congressional calls for the 
removal of OPM’s CIO, Donna Seymour.173 Inquiries into the cybersecurity 
incident continue, but the public’s interest in the agency’s excuses has waned. 
OPM has announced that it will suspend some program systems and applica-
tions in order to update their authentication systems. Additionally, OPM has 
announced they would provide three years of credit monitoring services to 
those affected by the cybersecurity failure in order to show some attempt in 
restoring citizens’ trust in the agency’s responsibility of conducting federal 
background investigations.174 While some have condemned the abysmal effort 
to bandage what is otherwise unrecoverable sensitive personal information, 
OPM continues to show a lack of remorse for this failure and it appears those 
who are most plausibly responsible for allowing the hack will retreat in 
peace.175 
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IV. OPM BREACH CLASS ACTIONS KEEP PILING UP 
Amidst a flurry of bureaucratic banter, congressional inquiry, and adminis-
trative politicking, those affected by the colossal failure of the programs and 
systems they trusted to safe keep their sensitive personal information were 
quick to shoot back with a flood of class actions lawsuits citing a whole host of 
legal claims, with more bound to follow. As early as June 29, 2015, the Ameri-
can Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”), together with the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-
CIO”), filed the largest class action against OPM, citing nearly 650,000 of its 
union members having been directly impacted by the breach.176 Within a week, 
the National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”), which represents 150,000 
employees across 31 federal agencies and departments, filed a suit directed at 
OPM’s then-Director Katherine Archuleta accusing her of failing act properly 
in her capacity as an agency head and negligence with regard to protecting fed-
eral workers’ data.177 Since these cases several other smaller class actions have 
filed on by affected individuals, enjoining others affected by the breach.178 
Each case shares a common thread of legal claims stemming from the 
Breach and commonly name OPM, Katherine Archuleta, Donna Seymour, and 
KeyPoint Government Solutions, the contractor alleged to have handled 
OPM’s background checks and suffered a computer network breach in 2014, 
as defendants.179 Generally, the complaints allege OPM had been on notice of 
cybersecurity deficiencies since 2007, compounding its failure to comply with 
the Privacy Act of 1974,180 the Administrative Procedure Act,181 FISMA and 
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the so-called improvements within FISMA 2014;182 even going so far as to 
claim common law negligence, and a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.183 
A. National Treasury Employees Union v. Katherine Archuleta 
Unique to the other class action suits brought against OPM in the wake of 
the breach, the NTEU cites Katherine Archuleta, OPM’s former Director as the 
sole defendant on grounds she is to be held negligent to the extent of her ca-
pacity as the head of a federal agency.184 By failing to heed the repeated warn-
ings of OPM’s OIG and otherwise failing to satisfy obligations imposed on her 
by statute and other appropriate authority, the complaint suggests Archuleta 
“manifested reckless indifference to its obligation to safeguard personal infor-
mation provided by NTEU members with the assurance that it would be pro-
tected against unauthorized disclosure.”185 As such, the NTEU argues Director 
Archuleta violated NTEU members’ constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy, including their right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment.186 
B. American Federation of Government Employees and AFL-CIO v. OPM, et. 
all 
While the NTEU complaint targets Director Archuleta, the AFGE and AFL-
CIO in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia jointly filed their 
complaint citing a whole host of procedural and administrative violations that 
extend beyond the former Director to include the agency as a whole and the 
third party contractors it utilized to develop its cybersecurity systems.187 The 
AFGE stated that they “will not sit idly by while OPM fails to comply with the 
most basic requests for information or provide an adequate response. Even af-
ter this historic security breach, OPM has continued to use poor data security 
practices and inferior private-sector strategies to solve its security woes.”188 
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Most notably, the complaint cites violation of the Privacy Act of 1974189 and 
the Administrative Procedure Act.190 
C. Transfer and Consolidation 
Despite the efforts of the affected individuals, the legal and procedural hur-
dles that such claims may face could impact their standing in the various dis-
tricts where the complaints have been filed. Even now, the Department of Jus-
tice has already filed a Motion for Transfer of Actions with the U.S. Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) in an effort to consolidate the com-
plaints.191 
On October 1st, the Panel heard arguments on authorization of transfer to 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.192 Despite opposition to 
centralization from the NTEU193, on October 9, 2015, the JPML ordered the 
transfer and centralization of the various claims to the District of Columbia 
given the common factual basis for the claims and requested relief.194 While the 
order applies to the three cases that the Justice Department submitted, the Pan-
el recognized that there are eleven other pending cases against OPM following 
the breach, that qualify also to be included in the centralization and transfer.195 
On March 14, 2016, counsel for the plaintiffs joined and submitted the amend-
ed consolidated complaint.196 The newly amended complaint includes forty 
named plaintiffs against the defendants, which have been limited to the United 
States through OPM in its agency capacity and KeyPoint.197 
V. IT’S TIME FOR A CHANGE: A PROPOSAL FOR A CYBERSECURITY 
REFORM SOLUTION 
The U.S. cybersecurity infrastructure system must adapt to better manage 
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federal data. The current state of federal law, amidst the rise of cyber threats, 
still lags behind the rapid development of technology; and recent efforts to en-
act cybersecurity legislation have failed. A complete overhaul is the only way 
to achieve a more secure data management infrastructure. While this is easier 
said than done, it is necessary to entertain all possible solutions in order to ef-
fectively implement meaningful reform that will better secure federal cyberse-
curity infrastructure. 
Essentially, the current framework must be upended. A centralized cyberse-
curity framework that delegates to DHS regulatory, policing, and enforcement 
power to more thoroughly account for the nature of cybersecurity threats and 
the impact that breaches pose to national security. In addition, any cybersecuri-
ty legislation must enhance oversight of federal agencies and government con-
tractors providing information technology and cybersecurity services to the 
government.198 This would extend liability on them, similar to the liability that 
has been imposed on private companies to protect civilian data.199 Furthermore, 
given the sensitive nature of security clearances for the federal workforce and 
the Federal Government’s interest in protecting national security it is argued 
here DHS should be granted the authority to complete the federal background 
check process for potential future federal employees. While this grant would 
centralize the process of background checks for the majority of federal em-
ployees, defense and intelligence agencies such the DOD and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency should retain their authority to conduct their own background 
checks. 
Similar to the proposed legislation under the Federal Information Security 
Management Reform Act of 2015 currently pending before the 114th Con-
gress, DHS must be tasked with “conducting targeted risk assessments and 
operational evaluations.”200 The current framework is inadequate because DHS 
has limited ability to shield agency networks with its highly invested cyberse-
curity monitoring platform, EINSTEIN.201 DHS can only enter an agency’s 
network with EINSTEIN if the agency asks for help.202 Under the proposed 
law, DHS could run intrusion detection and prevention technology on all agen-
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cy systems. Given the existing investment in cybersecurity infrastructure with-
in federal agencies, congressional legislation like the FISMA Reform Act of 
2015 must grant DHS centralized authority to immediately deploy the EIN-
STEIN platform in its full monitoring capacity within every federal agency. 
Together with binding authority, it is recommended that DHS be given the au-
thority to improve security incident response activities by suspending agency 
cybersecurity programs if programs do not meet statutorily imposed auditing 
requirements. In the interest of national security, DHS must be given the au-
thority to take control of agency networks during cyber-emergencies and clear-
ly define what a cyber-emergency might constitute. 
The cornerstone of any cybersecurity legislative reform is the inclusion of 
administrative and judicial mechanisms for extending liability on those inter-
nally responsible for allowing federal systems to fail, the ability to aggressive-
ly pursue cyber criminals, and initiate countervailing measures where foreign 
nation-states have engaged in unwarranted government espionage. In many 
instances, the government enjoys sovereign immunity, meaning it cannot face 
civil suits or prosecution over most subjects.203 Under the Federal Torts Claims 
Act,204 individuals can sue federal employees for negligence within the scope 
of their jobs.205 This negligence can extend to “loss of property, or personal 
injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government.”206 Under the current standard, courts 
have been hesitant to extend property protections to personal data; however, 
redefining personal information and data stored as personal property would 
offer a more comprehensive legal framework for courts to apply in the event of 
data breaches.207 
The more paramount concern, in addition to domestic security efforts, lies in 
the ability of the United States to combat cyber-warfare abroad. As attacks 
become more sophisticated, particularly in foreign regimes that promote gov-
ernment and industrial espionage, the United States must remain committed to 
engaging and setting the global standards for cybersecurity. However, when 
domestic policy is fragmented, the nation’s ability to hold the International 
Community to such policies is severely diminished. Evidence that progress is 
being made in this area has come following an official state visit from China’s 
President Xi Jinping.208 On September 25, 2015, President Obama and Presi-
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dent Xi announced an agreement between the United States and China to es-
tablish an open dialogue on combatting cybercrimes.209 
As part of the agreement, each commits to investigate cybercrimes, collect 
electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from its 
territory, and to provide timely responses to requests for information and assis-
tance concerning those activities.210 Furthermore, the U.S. and China will es-
tablish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and re-
lated issues.211 Perhaps most importantly, these nations committed that “neither 
country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft 
of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business 
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies 
or commercial sectors.”212 
Only time will tell whether these countries will live up to their commit-
ments. According to the agreement, the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue on the U.S. side, which signi-
fies an effort to centralize the role DHS will play in future direction of the 
American cybersecurity policy, and ensure that China fulfills its commitments 
to advance progress made thus far.213 To be sure, the agreed commitments do 
not resolve all challenges between the U.S. and China or other nation-states on 
cyber issues.214 However, according to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, it does 
“represent a step forward in U.S. efforts to address one of the sharpest areas of 
disagreement in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.”215 In the wake of the 
OPM Breach, the U.S. seemingly is working to address its own shortcomings 
on cybersecurity and meet the commitments of this new agreement.216 
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CONCLUSION 
The danger posed by the ever-growing threat of cyber-attacks against the na-
tion is heightened by the revelation of the weaknesses and failures in the Fed-
eral Government’s approach to cybersecurity despite having the budget to do 
so. While recent government initiatives have tried to combat the issue, it is 
important to note that no single technology or set of practices is sufficient to 
protect against all potential threats. A comprehensive and centralized strategy 
is required that includes well-trained personnel, effective and consistently ap-
plied processes, and appropriately implemented technologies. While agencies 
have elements of this strategy in place, more must be done to fully implement 
it and to remove existing weaknesses. Following the OPM Breach, OPM must 
be mandated to implement GAO and its Inspector General recommendations 
that will strengthen the agency’s ability to protect their systems and infor-
mation, reducing the risk of another potentially devastating cyber-attack. 
